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Introduction
All great art is the work of the whole living creature, body and soul,
and chiefly of the soul.1
Congress recently gave statutory force to this statement through the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 ("Act").2 After years of revision and
compromise,3 artists now have both economic and moral rights4 in their
works.
The Visual Artists Rights Act is the United States' first grant of
moral rights in federal copyright law.' The Act preserves the personal,
inalienable rights of the artist in his work, similar to the more extensive
protection provided by other countries.6 Unlike traditional copyright
law, which protects transferable economic interests of the copyright
owner,7 moral rights are rooted in the notion that an artist retains a sepa-
rate, nontransferable, noneconomic interest because the work itself is an
extension of his personality.' Broadly stated, a moral right is "the right
of the creator to create, to present his creation to the public in any de-
1. 135 CONG. REC. E2227-01 (daily ed. June 20, 1989) (statement of Rep. Edward J.
Markey introducing a predecessor of the Visual Artists Rights Act to the U.S. House of Repre-
sentatives, quoting John Ruskin).
2. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1991).
3. According to one commentator, the previous failure to provide for artists' rights "is
neither a tribute to nor an indictment of our legal system. The critical inquiry is whether our
failure to embrace the doctrine has resulted in inadequate protections for the important inter-
ests at stake." Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and Moral Right: Is An American Mar-
riage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1, 17 (1985). The overwhelming number of commentators
who have studied this question have concluded that the scope of protection in America for the
personal rights of creators is insufficient. Id. at 17-18.
4. The term "moral right" is derived from the French droit moral, which has no precise
English equivalent. Id. at 3 n.6. One commentator has written, "'Spiritual', 'non-economic'
and 'personal' convey something of the intended meaning" of "moral." SAM RICKETSON, THE
BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF LITERARY AND ARTISTIC WORKS 456
(1987).
5. Common law doctrines such as breach of contract and unfair competition and statutes
such as the Lanham Act have provided extremely limited protection of an author's moral
right. See Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) ("Although such decisions are
clothed in terms of proprietary right in one's creation, they also properly vindicate the author's
personal right to prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted form.").
6. Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright in the 101st Congress: Commentary on the Visual Artists
Rights Act and the Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act of 1990, 14 COLUM.-VLA J.L.
& ARTS 477, 478 (1991).
7. Generally, traditional copyright law consists of the right to prohibit reproduction,
derivation, performance, distribution, or display of a protected work. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
8. "When an artist creates.., he does more than bring into the world a unique object
having only exploitive possibilities; he projects into the world part of his personality and sub-
jects it to the ravages of public use. There are possibilities of injury to the creator other than
merely economic ones.... ." Martin A. Roeder, The Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the
Law of Artists, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L. REV. 554, 557 (1940).
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sired form or to withhold it, and to demand from everyone respect for his
personality as creator and for his works."9
Although it represents a landmark for artists' rights, the Act may
prove troublesome to interpret. In particular, the preemption provision
contains ambiguities that must be addressed in states which currently
provide moral rights protection. Exactly how this provision affects rights
previously enjoyed by artists is unclear. However, the principles of pre-
emption set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court and the text of the Act
suggest a solution. Under the U.S. Constitution, the Act should preempt
state law only if an "unyielding national interest" or express statement by
Congress would restrict states from enacting laws.10 In this light, the
text of the Act appears to permit many works that are outside of the
scope of federal protection to be protected under state moral rights
statutes.
This Note will examine this issue in the context of the history and
purpose of moral rights. Part I surveys the tradition of artists' rights
protection to give an historic framework to the analysis. Part II exam-
ines the Act itself. Part III discusses possible interpretations of the Act's
preemption provision. Part IV proposes that a faithful interpretation of
the text in light of Supreme Court guidelines demonstrates that the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act should permit state law to protect works left un-
protected by federal law.
I
History and Purpose of Moral Rights
A. The Tradition of Moral Rights
Before intellectual property laws were instituted, property rights for
creators were exclusively noneconomic in nature. Authors and inventors
were rewarded with public recognition, not with economic rights. I1 In
some societies, these rights were made legally enforceable and evolved
into moral rights statutes similar to those recognized by the Act.1 2 In
those communities, moral rights statutes were in place long before the
9. Id. at 558. There is doctrinal disagreement among commentators regarding whether
the right is a personal one, or an additional property right. The majority view is that the right
is personal. John H. Merryman, The Refrigerator of Bernard Buffet, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1023,
1025 n.5 (1976).
10. Goldstei n v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
11. Rufus C. King, The "Moral Rights" of Creators of Intellectual Property, 9 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 267 (1991).
12. Id. at 270.
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laws that governed intellectual property's protection of pecuniary
interests. 13
The difference between rights conferred by the traditional economic
protection of copyright law and moral rights protection can be illustrated
as follows: If an artist sells a sculpture but retains the copyright, the new
owner has only the right of possession in the object itself. As copyright
owner, the artist may, for example, prohibit unauthorized reproduction
of the work.' 4 In contrast, moral rights exist independently from copy-
right ownership and attach solely to the original artifact. Under the Act,
an artist may seek an injunction or monetary damages if he can establish
that a modification15 of the work would be prejudicial to his honor 6 or
reputation.' 7 Furthermore, the owner of a work of art cannot fail to give
the artist credit for the original work.18 The Act extends protection only
to the original artifact; reproductions 19 are not protected.20 For this rea-
son, the copyright holder is free to change a reproduction of the work or
juxtapose a copy in any chosen manner.2'
13. Id.; see supra note 7.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (1988).
15. Modifications that destroy the intrinsic aesthetic quality of the work violate the right
of integrity. Kwall, supra note 3, at 8-9.
16. "Prejudice to honor" has been defined as the violation of the right to an authentic
communication without distortion and the right that the communication be identified as the
author's. "The feeling that prompts the rebuke 'Don't put words in my mouth' comes close to
capturing the essence of prejudice to 'honor.'" Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings
on S. 1198 and S. 1252 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyright and Trademarks of the
Comm. of the Judiciary, United States Senate, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 32 (1989) [hereinafter
Senate Hearings] (statement of Prof. Edward Damich).
17. "Reputation" in this context refers to the artistic or professional reputation of the
artist and not his general character, as is at issue, for example, in a defamation case. H.R.
REP. No. 514, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1990).
18. This illustrates the right of attribution, or "paternity," which protects the author's
name and connection as author of a work. Raymond Sarraute, Current Theory on the Moral
Right of Authors and Artists Under French Law, 16 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 478 (1968).
19. Although the Visual Artists Rights Act does not protect reproductions, some state
statutes do if the work is in view of the public. See, e.g., RI. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-3 (1987);
N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 11.01 (McKinney Supp. 1988). For example, New York
protects a reproduction which is a "copy, in any medium, of a work of fine art, that is dis-
played or published under circumstances that, reasonably construed, evinces an intent that it
be taken as a representation of a work of fine art as created by the artist." Id. § 11.01(16).
20. Congressional history indicates that, "(t]he bill recognizes the special value inherent
in the original or limited edition copy of a work of art. The original or few copies with which
the artist was most in contact embody the artist's 'personality' far more closely than subse-
quent mass produced images." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 12 (statement of Prof.
Jane Ginsburg). This reflects the concern that the bill "protects the legitimate interests of
visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners and users, and without undue
interference with the successful operation of the American copyright system." Id. at 10.
21. Such juxtaposition might offend an artist. In Morita v. Omni Publications Int'l, 741
F. Supp. 1107 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), the artist designed a glass sculpture to represent his vision of
the bombing of Hiroshima. The sculpture, designed to give the appearance of a peace dove
[Vol. 15:165
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Historically, European nations created the concept of moral rights
to protect works of the mind by recognizing that a work embodies an
author's personality.22 Moral rights protect this right of personality by
protecting the artist's work, which is seen as "an emanation or manifesta-
tion of [the artist's] personality, as his 'spiritual child.' "23 The impor-
tance of personality has been acknowledged in both the German
Constitution and the European Declaration of Human Rights. In these
documents, the right of personality is elevated to the level of a constitu-
tionally-protected fundamental right.24 The right of personality includes
the right to one's identity, name, reputation, occupation, integrity of per-
son, and privacy. 25 The artist's interest in the right of personality was
extended to protect the artist's work, and through the concept of moral
rights, the artist has a legally protectible interest if that work is distorted
or misrepresented by another.26
France has been the innovator of moral rights protection. The
French judiciary began enforcement of these rights almost a century
ago27 and subsequently codified them in a civil statute. 28 Because the
French perceived works of art as the extension of the artist's personality,
"the system was developed under the belief that artwork is different from
other forms of property, and that the law of property must be appropri-
ately modified in order to deal with the special considerations raised by
works of art."29
Because it currently represents the most comprehensive moral rights
protection,30 the French system serves as the model against which other
countries' moral rights laws may be compared. The French system con-
sists of three protected rights: 1) droit d'auteur, which is analogous to
traditional U.S. protection of the copyright owner's economic interests;
31
shattering in flight, was photographed and then reproduced on the cover of a magazine juxta-
posed with a pronuclear caption: "Nuclear Renaissance: Reactors Are Back and the Reactions
Are Good." Id. at 1109-10. Both the photographer and the sculptor brought suit under sec-
tion 14.03 of the New York Arts and Cultural Affairs Law. Id. at 1114-15. Because the
original sculpture and its photograph were not "altered" but merely juxtaposed with the maga-
zine cover's caption, the court found that the New York law was not violated. Id.
22. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1025.
23. RICKETSON, supra note 4, at 456.
24. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1025 n.6.
25. Id. at 1025.
26. Id.
27. Eden v. Whistler, Cass. civ. soc., 1900 Recueil Sirey [S. Jur.] II 490 (Fr.).
28. FRENCH LAW No. 57-298 ON LITERARY AND ARTISTIC PROPERTY, art. 6, reprinted
in UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1987).
29. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1037.
30. See Edward J. Damich, The Right ofPersonality: A Common-Law Basis for the Protec-
tion of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REv. 1, 4 (1988).
31. See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
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2) droit de suite, which gives artists and authors an economic right to
share in the resale royalties of their work;3 2 and 3) droit moral, or moral
right.33
Droit moral consists of four components: 1) the right of integrity of
the work, which protects the work against distortion, dismemberment, or
misrepresentation; 2) the right of paternity, which allows an author to
claim or disclaim authorship;34 3) the right of divulgation, which gives an
author the right to decide when and whether a work of art is complete;
35
and 4) the right of an artist to withdraw36 the work from its owner on
payment of an indemnity. Droit moral protects the artist's interests in all
"works of the mind," including paintings, sculpture, film, choreography,
and literary works. 37 The duration of this right is perpetual and passes to
the author's heirs at death.38
Moral rights were incorporated into the Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works during its third revision in
1928. 3" The Berne Convention produced a multilateral treaty40 that set
minimum standards for the protection of literary and artistic works for
all member states.' Legal scholars have noted that because Berne repre-
sents a compromise with common law countries that wished to retain
32. Droit de suite permits the artist to benefit from the appreciation value of the work by
entitling him to a percentage of all subsequent sales. California offers similar benefits under
the Artist's Resale Royalty Act, wherein a five percent royalty on each sale of a work is either
paid to the artist or put on deposit for benefit of an arts council. CAL. CIV. CODE § 986 (West
Supp. 1992); See Morseburg v. Babylon, 621 F.2d 972, 976 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 983 (1980) (California Resale Royalty Act provides artists with an "economic interest of
a limited duration in the proceeds of sales other than the initial one.").
33. The focus of the Visual Artists Rights Act is the protection of moral rights. Several
excellent articles have been written about the historical roots of moral rights: see generally
Merryman, supra note 9; Kwall, supra note 3; and Sarraute, supra note 18.
34. FRENCH LAW No. 57-298, supra note 28, provides in relevant part:
The author shall enjoy the right to respect for his name, his authorship, and his
work. This right shall be attached to his person.
It shall be perpetual, inalienable and imprescriptible.
It may be transferred mortis causa to the heirs of the author. The exercise of
this right may be conferred on a third person by testamentary provisions.
35. Id. The parallel doctrine in U.S. copyright law is the right of first publication. See
Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
36. French case law granting relief on this point is rare. No analogous provision exists in
U.S. law.
37. FRENCH LAW No. 57-298, supra note 28.
38. Sarraute, supra note 18, at 483.
39. Kwall, supra note 3, at 10-11 n.38.
40. Presently, there are 77 members of the Berne union. S. REP. No. 352, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1988).
41. Melville B. Nimmer, Implications of the Prospective Revisions of the Berne Convention
and the United States Copyright Law, 19 STAN. L. REV. 499 (1967).
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some freedom over their moral rights policy, moral rights under the
treaty are not as extensive as under French law.
4 2
The Berne Convention protects three categories of rights: 1) the
right to claim authorship of the work; 2) the right to object to any distor-
tion, mutilation, or other alteration of the work; and 3) the right to object
to any other action that would be prejudicial to the author's honor or
reputation.43 The Berne Treaty protects a broad range of works, includ-
ing "every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain,
whatever may be the mode or form of expression."" The work is pro-
tected during the life of the author and for fifty years after his death.45
Although the United States joined the Berne Convention in 1988 by the
enactment of the Berne Implementation Act,46 Congress specifically pro-
vided that U.S. membership did not expand or reduce the moral rights, if
any, that were currently available to artists in this country.47
42. RICKETSON, supra note 4, at 467.
43. Nimmer, supra note 41, at 520. Article 6bis of the Berne Convention Treaty currently
provides:
(1) Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the transfer of the
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work, and to
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification, or other derogatory action
in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.
(2) The rights granted to the author in accordance with the preceding paragraph
shall, after his death, be maintained, at least until the expiry of the economic rights,
and shall be exercisable by the persons or institutions authorized by the legislation of
the country where protection is claimed. However, those countries whose legislation,
at the moment of their ratification or accession to this Act, does not provide for the
protection after the death of the author of all the rights set out in the preceding
paragraph may provide that some of these rights may, after his death, cease to be
maintained.
(3) The means of redress for safeguarding the rights granted by this Article shall be
governed by the legislation of the country where protection is claimed.
The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, July 24, 1971, art.
6bis, reprinted in RICKETSON, supra note 4, at 933.
44. Berne Convention, supra note 43, art. 2, para. 1, reprinted in RICKETSON, supra note
4, at 930; see also Karen Gantz, Protecting Artists' Moral Rights: A Critique of the California
Art Preservation Act as a Model for Statutory Reform, 49 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 873 (1981)
(comparing scope of Berne protection against protection afforded by other moral rights
systems).
45. If at the time of Berne ratification the country does not extend moral rights protection
beyond the life of the author, post-mortem protection is not required. RICKETSON, supra note
4, at 327-28.
46. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-08, 411, 501, 504 (Supp. 1991).
47. See RALPH E. LERNER & JUDITH BRESLER, ART LAW: THE GUIDE FOR COLLEC-
TORS, INVESTORS, DEALERS, AND ARTISTS 437-38 (1989).
By joining the Berne Convention, the United States increases the number of countries
with which it enjoys copyright reciprocity. Deborah Ross, Comment, The United States Joins
the Berne Convention: New Obligations for the Authors'Moral Right?, 68 N.C. L. REV. 363,
366 (1990). Although a U.S. citizen could previously "backdoor" protection by publishing
1992]
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B. The Rationale for Moral Rights Protection
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990 represents a landmark devel-
opment in American intellectual property law. Although artists in the
United States have created for over two centuries without its protection,
the Act fills a perceived need. As artist Richard Serra stated after an
unsuccessful legal battle to prevent the destruction of his site-specific
work, "[t]he Government has to learn that art is not property. '48 Prop-
erty law in the traditional sense fails to protect the very thing that makes
the artifact valuable: the expression of the artist as embodied in the
work.49
According to legal scholar John Merryman, moral rights protection
serves "the interest in seeing or preserving the opportunity to see the
work as the artist intended it, undistorted and 'unimproved' by the uni-
lateral actions of others, even those with the best intentions and the most
impressive credentials. 50 Merryman states that "art is an aspect to our
present culture and our history; it helps tells us who we are and where we
came from. To revise, censor, or improve the work is to falsify a piece of
that culture." 5'
Professor Ginsburg adds that the Act answers questions regarding
the credibility of the United States as a member of the Berne Conven-
tion. 2 Ginsburg states that some Berne unionists perceived the 1988
Berne Implementation Act as inadequate and expressed doubts regarding
the United States' commitment to moral rights.53 Once adopted, the Act
represented at least some level of commitment of the United States to its
simultaneously in a Berne member country, the process is often considered impracticable. Id.
at 366.
United States membership in Berne, which has been debated for over 100 years, has been
controversial. Although some argue that the advantage of international copyright reciprocity
justifies U.S. membership, others state that the burdens of Berne adherence are not outweighed
by any true practical advantage. See Ralph Oman, The United States and the Berne Union: An
Extended Courtship, 3 J.L. & TECH. 71, 105, 119-18 (1988). For example, Oman asserts that
the modifications that must be made in U.S. law in order to adhere to Berne would lead to
drastic, unnecessary changes that would upset business relations between owners and users of
copyrighted works. Id. at 116. Further, Oman points out that enforcement under Berne has
been lax. Id. at 115.
48. Richard Lacayo, The "Moral Rights" of Artists, TIME, Mar. 14, 1988, at 59.
49. See discussion infra at part I.C.
50. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1030. In this same vein, Sen. Edward Kennedy quoted
Katherine Anne Porter's words when proposing the bill to the Senate: "The arts live continu-
ously. They outlive governments and creeds and societies, even the very civilizations that
produce them.... They are what we find again when the ruins are cleared away." 136 CONG.
REc. S17574 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1990).
51. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1031.
52. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 478-79.
53. Id.
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Berne obligations.54 Ginsburg argues that the Act is a necessary "first
step" in the process of Berne compliance.5"
Additionally, substantial evidence indicated that there was a signifi-
cant need for such protection.56 The 1976 Copyright Act 57 was primar-
ily intended to protect the marketplace by preventing economic
exploitation of original ideas. In contrast, an artist, who will generally
encourage others to share ideas and is principally interested in the physi-
cal artwork itself, had no protection over her works under the 1976
Act.5" Moral rights protection was the sole means to protect the physical
"work of art" and the reason why the visual arts were the appropriate
starting point: the goal of the artistic process is to make a work that
embodies an artist's unique thought.59 Even subtle modification of the
54. Id. at 479. The United States would be subject to repercussions of nonadherence to
the Berne Convention including criticism by member nations or trial before the International
Court of Justice. Another likely source of enforcement is the U.S. court system. Oman, supra
note 47, at 116 ("The United States, as a people, respects its laws, and relies upon the vigilance
of its courts to enforce its treaty obligations.").
If it chose to withdraw from the Berne Convention, the United States would lose signifi-
cant multilateral copyright protection under the Universal Copyright Convention. Id. at 118.
55. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 497. Congress, however, has determined that U.S. law
prior to the Act complied with Berne requirements and that the Act merely brought "U.S. law
into greater harmony with laws of other Berne countries." H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17,
at 7-8, 10. Rep. Robert Kastenmeier, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Administration of Justice, stated, "While this title is not
necessary for this country's adherence to the Berne Convention, . . . it certainly strengthens
our commitment to that convention." 136 CONG. REC. H13313 (daily ed. Oct. 27, 1990).
56. As one artist testified before Congress:
The Visual Artists Rights Act is of the utmost importance to professional artists who
build their future on the integrity and authenticity of [art] in public and private col-
lections and to the public for preserving its cultural legacy. ... Artists must sustain
the belief in the importance of their work if they are to do their best. If there exists
the real possibility that the fruits of this effort will be destroyed after a mere ten to
twenty years the incentive to excel is diminished and replaced with purely profit
motivation.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 6 (statement of artist Weltzin Blix).
A California attorney estimates that 100 artists per year call her law firm requesting infor-
mation about rights in their work after its sale. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 140 (state-
ment of Ms. Linda Cawley). Artist Tom Van Sant also testified that, "I don't know an artist
that hasn't suffered from the loss of work at one stage or another in their careers [sic]. They
have long careers, and some of our major works in California have been lost throughout the
years." Id. at 143.
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
58. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 478-79.
59. Professor Ginsburg has stated:
[T]he physical existence of the original itself possesses an importance independent
from any communication of its contents by means of copies. Were the original de-
faced or destroyed, we would still have copies, we would all know what the work
looked like, but, I believe, we would all agree that the original's loss deprives us of
something uniquely valuable.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 12.
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work, which embodies this unique thought, destroys the artist's
message.' Thus, moral rights legislation was seen as important for the
protection of artists, the creative process, and the role that artists play in
American culture."
C. The Need for Moral Rights Legislation
Until the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, no na-
tional system of moral rights protection existed.62 Although a few recent
state statutes were enacted, 63 works of art were treated as any other ob-
ject of property." Creators of works were required to find alternative
protections for their interests under such doctrines as unfair competition,
breach of contract, defamation, invasion of privacy, 6  and under statutes
such as the Lanham Act.66 For the most part, this was not a satisfactory
60. Professor Damich, in his statement to the Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks, said:
The artistically creative act is a communication to the public of the personality of the
artist. Not only should she have the right to control the time, manner, and circum-
stances of this communication, but also, since it is a continuing communication, the
artist has a right that it be authentic and that it be identified as her communication.
Distorting this communication may cause people to think less of the artist, but even
if they think better of her, the artist has sustained an injury to her personality.
Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 32.
61. Rep. Markey, in his introductory statement to the House, stated:
Artists in this country play a very important role in capturing the essence of culture
and recording it for future generations. It is often through art that we are able to see
truths, both beautiful and ugly. Therefore, I believe it is paramount to the integrity
of our culture that we preserve the integrity of our artworks as expressions of the
creativity of the artist.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 6.
62. See discussion supra at part I.A.
63. Eric M. Brooks, "Tilted" Justice: Site-Specific Art and Moral Rights After US. Berne
Adherence to the Berne Convention, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1431, 1461 (1989).
64. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1037. This commentator has further stated that:
The underdeveloped state of our law is ... not surprising. The moral right of
the artist is a relatively recent growth in France, where it has had its principal devel-
opment. By the time the moral right began to develop, French art had been of world
importance for nearly a century. By comparison, American art has achieved interna-
tional recognition only in the last two decades; what has been rather lyrically called
"the triumph of American art" is a very recent phenomenon. Legal change usually
lags behind social and cultural change.
Id. at 1042.
65. Kwall, supra note 3, at 18.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. Montoro, 648 F.2d 602 (9th Cir. 1981); Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d
14 (2d Cir. 1976); Wildlife Int'l, Inc. v. Clements, 591 F. Supp. 1542, 1548 (S.D. Oh. 1984);
Follett v. New Am. Library, 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
The purpose of the Lanham Act is to protect "consumers and competitors from a wide
variety of misrepresentations of products and services in commerce." Allen v. National Video,
Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The Act prohibits use in connection with goods
or services of false or misleading representations in, for example, incidents of product imita-
tion, misrepresentation, and misappropriation.
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solution. Since the creator had to force a moral rights claim into a cause
of action intended to apply to different circumstances, resulting obstacles
often precluded recovery.67
For example, in Wojnarowicz v. American Family Association,6" mul-
timedia artist David Wojnarowicz brought suit under the Lanham Act
after the American Family Association published and distributed pam-
phlets containing fragments of the artist's collages that depicted explicit
sexual acts. The pamphlets were published in an effort to stop National
Endowment for the Arts funding for such works.6 9 The court found that
"[b]y excising and reproducing only small portions of plaintiff's work,
defendants have largely reduced plaintiff's multi-imaged works of art to
solely sexual images, devoid of any political and artistic context.
'70
Nonetheless, because application of the Lanham Act is traditionally lim-
ited to commercial practices, and the pamphlet could not be character-
ized as the "advertising or promotion" of goods or services, the plaintiff
was denied recovery.71
Furthermore, a claim under the Lanham Act can only succeed
where an artist's name has a substantial secondary meaning. 72 Thus, an
emerging artist who had not yet built a reputation would have been un-
able to seek protection under this statute. The Lanham Act would not
prevent the loss of the works of many artists who had failed to achieve
eminence at the time the artwork was modified or destroyed.
Remedy under contract law was similarly unsatisfactory. Although
courts have urged that artists contract individually for moral rights,73
generally artists do not execute formal agreements on the sale of their
work.74 Nor is the artist, particularly when young or unknown, in a very
67. Kwall, supra note 3, at 23.
68. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
69. Id. at 133-34.
70. Id. at 138.
71. Id. at 142. However, the plaintiff succeeded in showing a moral rights violation under
the New York Authorship Rights Act. Id. at 141.
72. Susan L. Solomon, Comment, Monty Python and the Lanham Act: In Search of a
Moral Right, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 452, 476 (1977).
73. See Crimi v. Rutgers Presbyterian Church, 89 N.Y.S.2d 813, 819 (Sup. Ct. 1949)
("The time for the artist to have reserved any rights was when he and his attorney participated
in the drawing of the contract."); Serra v. United States Gen. Servs. Admin., 847 F.2d 1045,
1049 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[1I]f he wished to retain some degree of control as to the duration and
location of the display of his work, he had the opportunity to bargain for such rights in making
the contract for the sale of his work.").
74. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1043; see also Robert Projansky, The Perilous World of
Art Law, JURis DR., June 1974, at 14, who states:
The vast majority of artists whose work is sold through dealers, for example, have no
written contract with the gallery at all, and most of those few that are in writing are
simple letter agreements drafted by laymen. The gallery handles the artist's work,
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powerful bargaining position.75 Even where requested, such contracts in
practice are rarely successfully enforced.7 6 Additional problems arise
when the artwork changes hands. Because no system of public records
exists, and it is impractical to attach a notice of restrictions on the art-
work without defacing it,77 there is no method of securely binding suc-
cessive owners.78
The Visual Artists Rights Act, on the other hand, gives artists the
right to protect their works after ownership is transferred. The Act also
permits artists to maintain their reputation and connection with a work
independent of ownership. Unlike other causes of action that could not
accommodate this need, protection of moral rights under the Act was an
important first step in protecting a work's authorship.
II
The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
A. The Right of Attribution
The Visual Artists Rights Act protects two rights of authorship: at-
tribution and integrity.79 The right of attribution is analogous to the
French right of paternity,8 ° which grants the author8 1 of a work of visual
art the rights to: 1) claim authorship of the work; 2 2) prevent the use of
his name on any work of visual art which he did not create; 3) prevent
the use of his name as the author of a work of visual art in the event of a
looks after his money, sends his works out of town-sometimes out of the country-
all without a word in writing.
75. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1043. But see King, supra note 11, at 295-96 ("In con-
structing legal rights, we should avoid assumptions about whether one party to a transaction
or the other will generally have the better bargaining position .... Creators ... will always
have at least one advantage in any negotiation for economic rights, namely, that the property is
to some extent unique.").
76. For example, the Museum of Modem Art refused to accept a donated work where the
artist insisted on a contract. Martha Buskirk, Moral Rights: First Step or False Start?, ART IN
AMERICA, July 1991, at 37. The contract reserved the reproduction rights, stipulated that the
owner must obtain the artist's consent before works were lent to exhibitions, and required the
owner to make the work available on a limited basis for loan to exhibitions at the artist's
request. Id. This type of contract, known as a Projansky-Sieglaub agreement, is seen as too
restrictive for an art exhibitor or purchaser to sign. See also JOHN H. MERRYMAN & ALBERT
E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 152 (1987) (discussing the use of contracts
between artists and purchasers).
77. MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 76, at 1044.
78. Merryman, supra note 9, at 1043-44.
79. 17 U.S.C. § 106A (Supp. 1991).
80. Ginsburg, supra note 6, at 478.
81. The term "author" is used in the statute to denote the creator of the work. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(a)(1)(B). Authors of a joint work are co-owners of these rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b).
82. This right includes the right to publish anonymously or under a pseudonym. H.R.
REP. No 514, supra note 17, at 14.
(Vol. 15:165
MORAL RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR VISUAL ARTISTS
distortion, mutilation, or other modification which would be prejudicial
to his or her honor or reputation. 3
For example, an artist whose sculpture has been altered may seek an
injunction to have his name removed from the work if he can show preju-
dice to his honor or reputation.84 However, the Act does not define
"prejudice." The Committee on the Judiciary ("Committee") "believes
that the best approach ... is to focus on the artistic or professional honor
or reputation as embodied in the work that is protected." 5 However, if
it is generally agreed among experts that the modification is an aesthetic
improvement, there may be no "prejudice" in the required sense. Simi-
larly, this language appears to foreclose recovery for modifications that
appear slight to the viewer, but trouble the artist greatly. 6
The restriction that modifications be demonstrably prejudicial to the
artist's honor or reputation, which does not have a civil law counterpart,
appears to ignore a basic premise of the artistic process. That is, the
artist strives to make a finished work which embodies or illustrates an
idea. Any change to the finished work alters the communication of that
idea. Once a work leaves the artist's possession, he would lose the ability
to deliver his message to all subsequent viewers of the work. 7 This
would seem to constitute an injury worthy of permitting an artist to re-
move his name from a work, regardless of whether the artist's profes-
sional reputation is marred.
83. The terms "honor or reputation" are adopted from the Berne Convention. See also
supra notes 16-17.
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(2).
85. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 15. The Committee further states:
The trier of fact must examine the way in which a work has been modified and the
professional reputation of the author of the work. Rules 701-706 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence permit expert testimony on the issue of whether the modification
affects the artist's honor or reputation.
Id. at 15-16. Generally, if the work is of recognized stature, any modification may establish
such harm. Id.
86. There are numerous instances where artists have refused to tolerate even slight modifi-
cations in their work. For example, the photographer Brett Weston, the son of world-re-
nowned photographer Edward Weston, refused to allow his own negatives to be printed by
another, although countless galleries exhibited the work of his father as printed by his brother,
Cole Weston. One art dealer stated, "[Brett] had watched the difference between the way
Edward worked and how Cole printed the negatives. I think he felt that it may have been a
necessary financial inheritance for his father's sons, but the artistic compromise was something
he couldn't live with." As a result, Brett Weston destroyed all but twelve of his thousands of
negatives, some sixty years work, to avoid posthumous distortion of his work by another
printer. Admittedly a purist, Brett Weston has stated, "No one can print another photogra-
pher's negatives. It's just too personal. There are infinite choices to make." Suzanne
Muchnic, A Bonfire of the Vanities?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at F1.
87. See supra note 16.
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B. The Right of Integrity
Second, the Visual Artists Rights Act protects the right of integrity
against unauthorized changes to a work. The artist may obtain either an
injunction or monetary damages for the intentional distortion, mutila-
tion, or other modification of the work that would be prejudicial to his
honor or reputation."8 An artist may also seek recovery for destruction
of a work regardless of the defendant's scienter if the work is "of recog-
nized stature." 9 Although the Act leaves this term undefined, a work of
recognized stature presumably is a work that has achieved some acclaim.
C. Limitations of the Act
1. Exceptions to the Act
Significant exceptions to the Act exist. First, modifications to a
work resulting from the passage of time or the inherent nature of the
materials are not protected.' Given the purpose of the Act, this provi-
sion should ideally apply only to modifications due to passive aging, not
to any attempt to "speed" the aging process. For example, the art critic
Clement Greenberg, as executor of artist David Smith's estate, allowed
several sculptures to be placed outside and "weather" so that the paint
would eventually fade.91 In Mr. Greenberg's judgment, the result im-
proved the aesthetic quality, and hence the value, of the work. There is
evidence which indicates that doing so would have enraged and frus-
trated the intent of Mr. Smith.92 Results such as those caused by Mr.
Greenberg violate the purpose of the Act.93
Another exception to the Act provides that modifications that are
the result of conservation or public presentation, including lighting and
placement, do not establish a basis for liability.94 This reflects the view
that the Act intended to protect only the single, original work; the artist
does not retain control over the environment in which his work is
presented.
88. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 22; 17 U.S.C. § 106A (a)(3)(A).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B). This subsection further provides that no showing of the
defendant's state of mind is required to obtain an injunction, but monetary damages are only
available if the conduct was intentional or grossly negligent.
90. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(l).
91. See Sarah Ann Smith, Note, The New York Authorship Rights Act, 70 CORNELL L.
REV. 158, 163 (1984).
92. Id. at 163.
93. Note that, unless state law provided otherwise, the estate could not recover against
Mr. Greenberg in any event because the Act only protects the work during the artist's life. 17
U.S.C. § 106A(d)(1). If such a right were enforceable, however, interests of the artist's survi-
vors, who may want to maximize the work's economic potential, could conflict with the inter-
ests of those who would seek to preserve the original work as created by the artist.
94. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(2).
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A third exception is that the Act strictly limits protection for repro-
ductions. As an initial matter, an unsigned reproduction is not consid-
ered a "work of visual art" for purposes of the Act.9 For example, a
magazine could publish a photograph of a sculpture with a caption offen-
sive to the artist.96 Only limited editions of two hundred or fewer, signed
by the artist and numbered, are protected. Any modification or altera-
tion of a work falling outside this limited scope would not be actiona-
ble.97 Nor could an artist sue to remove his name from a publication that
reproduced a work in a manner which distorted it.9' This may reflect the
recognition that the reputation of the artist is most closely connected to
an original, or at least signed, piece.
Very broad protection of reproductions arguably violates the first
amendment.99 However, the presentation of a distorted or altered repro-
duction as the work of the original artist might be considered false, and
therefore unprotected, speech. 1" It is unlikely that a distorted reproduc-
tion that is not attributable to the original artist would violate that art-
ist's right of personality, and consequently any moral right. Similarly,
moral rights statutes do not interfere with the right to comment upon an
artist's work. Therefore, it appears that moral rights protection of repro-
ductions is possible without a violation of the first amendment.
2 Scope of Moral Rights Protection Under the Act
The Act protects only a narrow category of art works in comparison
to state laws. 101 The Act creates categories of works based upon various
95. Works of visual art are defined as those "existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author .... 17
U.S.C. § 101.
96. See supra note 21.
97. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3) states that "any such reproduction, depiction, portrayal, or
other use of a work is not a destruction, distortion, mutilation, or other modification." See also
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 17-18. ("[I]mposing liability [where a work is reproduced
in a publication] would not further the paramount goal of the legislation: to preserve and
protect certain categories of original works of art.").
98. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(c)(3).
99. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also Hustler Magazine v, Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 53 (1988)
(deliberate distortion as satire is protected under the first amendment).
100. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (held
that the New York Authorship Rights Act for the protection of an author's moral rights does
not violate the first amendment either facially or as applied).
101. 17 U.S.C. § 101 provides that the following are protected under the Act:
(1) "a painting, drawing, print or sculpture, existing in a single copy, in a limited edition
of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively numbered by the author . .. ."
(2) "a still photographic image produced for exhibition purposes only, existing in a sin-
gle copy ... or in a limited edition of 200 copies or fewer that are signed and consecutively
numbered by the author."
17 U.S.C. § 101 specifically excludes:
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artists' media. At first glance, these categories appear to make the Act
easy to interpret and administer. However, some problems may arise.
For example, artists often actively attempt to break out of traditional
media or to invent new ones. These modern works may be unprotected
solely because of their failure to fit within a defined category. Further,
some classifications do not assist purchasers of work. For example, only
photographs taken "for exhibition purposes" are covered by the Act.102
Yet photographic artists have created many valuable and highly ac-
claimed works now considered to be artistic who were motivated origi-
nally by the desire to document, advertise, or for purely personal reasons.
In any event, a purchaser rarely has notice or evidence of the photogra-
pher's purpose when he buys the work. Thus, by narrowing the scope of
protected works, the Act threatens to create uncertainty in the art
marketplace.
This limitation on the scope of works protected is not justified. The
statute is intended to protect the creative personality, which may move
from one medium to another without thinking of the legal intricacies
involved. Limited categorization is overly restrictive. 103 Legal standards
have already been developed to assist courts in defining a "work of fine
art."' The costs inherent in the legal system will undoubtedly discour-
age frivolous claims1"5 where relief is sought for the destruction of a mer-
itless work, such as an absent-minded doodling or a kindergartner's
work. An exclusion for commercial works is sufficient to protect adver-
tisers and publishers.
(A)(i) "any poster, map, globe, chart, technical drawing, diagram, model, ap-
plied art, motion picture or other audio visual work, book, magazine, newspaper, periodical,
data base, electronic information service, electronic publication, or similar publication;"
(ii) "any merchandising item or advertising, promotional, descriptive, cover-
ing, or packaging material or container;"
(B) "any work made for hire;"
(C) "any work not subject to copyright protection .
102. Id.
103. The Act does not protect applied art, presumably to protect commercial interests.
However, depending upon court interpretation, this exclusion may result in the loss or altera-
tion of pieces equally as important as "pure" fine art. See Peter H. Karlen, Moral Rights In
California, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 675, 702 (1982) ("[A]II useful works which may be feats of
craft or engineering skill should not be excepted from the category of fine art. To do so 'would
exclude the Ghiberti doors of Florence, or the fountains of Paris or Versailles.' The work of
fine art ... appeals primarily to the aesthetic senses even though it can serve a utilitarian or
ornamental purpose.") (citation omitted).
104. See generally Leonard D. Duboff, What Is Art? Toward A Legal Definition, 12 HAS-
TINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 303 (1990).
105. One recent estimate states that a minimum of $2,000-3,000 is required to litigate such
claims. Daniel Grant, Before You Cut Up That Picasso.... WORLD MONITOR, Feb. 1992, at
58-59.
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In general, state statutes are more generous in protecting a full range
of various media. Pennsylvania is among the states offering the broadest
protection: a work in any medium is protected so long as the work is of
recognized quality." 6 In New Mexico, any original work of art of recog-
nized quality is protected from alteration or destruction if the work is in
public view. 1o7 Rhode Island protects all original works of visual art of
any medium, with the exception of film. 108 Connecticut provides an ex-
tensive list of protected media, including masters from which copies of an
artistic work can be made."
Some state laws permit recovery in a broader range of circum-
stances. For example, in California and Pennsylvania, no intentional de-
facement, alteration, or destruction is allowed regardless of the artist's
ability to prove damage to honor or reputation, 110 so long as the work is
of recognized quality.I 1  Massachusetts goes further by adding a prohi-
bition against acts of gross negligence. 112
3. Duration of Moral Rights Protection
Presently, a work created on or after June 1, 1991, is protected for
the life of the author.11 I If a work has been created before June 1, 1991,
but the title has not yet been transferred, the rights last for the life of the
author plus fifty years.1 14 This seems insufficient to meet the Act's goal
of art preservation. Indeed, one of the most notorious examples of the
destruction of artwork would not fall within the present Act: Picasso's
106. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2103, 2106 (1991).
107. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B-3(B) (Michie 1991). A work of fine art is "any original
work of visual or graphic art of any media... of recognized quality." Id. § 13- 4B-2(B). Like
the U.S. Congress, the New Mexico legislature found that moral rights protection served a
twofold purpose: to protect the reputation of the artist, and to preserve the integrity of artistic
creations. Id. § 13-4B-1.
108. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-62-2(e) (Michie 1987). The work is protected against modifica-
tion, alteration, or defacement if on public display. Id. § 5-62-3.
109. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116s(2) (West Supp. 1991).
110. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987-990 (West Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10
(1991).
111. The artist must prove that the work was of "recognized quality." CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 987(b)(2)(C)(1) (West Supp. 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2102, 2104(a), 2106 (1991).
The difference between "recognized quality" and "recognized stature" is unclear because no
legal standard has been developed for measuring the latter. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B).
112. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1991). Some states prohibit acts
of gross negligence only if performed by one who "frames, conserves or restores" works of fine
art. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 2104(b) (1991).
113. Or, in the case of joint authors, until the death of the last surviving author. All rights
run until the end of the calendar year in which they would otherwise expire. 17 U.S.C.
§ 106A(d)(3)-(4).
114. 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 106A(d), 302. There is longer protection given to a work created,
but not sold, in May, 1991, than a work created in June, 1991.
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painting "Trois Femmes" was cut into one-inch squares by two art inves-
tors and sold as "original Picasso pieces."' 1 5 Because Picasso is no
longer living, the investors are free from liability under the Act.
The narrow scope of the Act's protection is contrary to its stated
policy of preserving artwork for the future. The Committee states that
the Act "recognizes that destruction of works of art has a detrimental
effect on the artist's reputation, and that it also represents a loss to soci-
ety." '1 6 In light of this concern, it is troubling that the Act extends pro-
tection only during the life of the artist.1 7 Withdrawing protection after
the artist's death does nothing to further society's interest in art work.
The Committee states that art preservation is one goal of the Act; 18
however, extending federal protection only during the artist's lifetime
casts doubt on the legitimacy of this statement. Perhaps this section's
main effect will be to minimize frivolous litigation over minor works." 9
D. Other Aspects of the Act
Rights under the Act may not be transferred, but they may be
waived. The waiver requirements are strict: the waiver instrument must
identify the work and its uses, and must be signed by the author. 120 Be-
115. Grant, supra note 105, at 58; see also Timothy M. Casey, Note, The Visual Artists
Rights Act, 14 HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J. 85, 86 (1991).
116. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 16.
117. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d).
118. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 16 ("The bill furthers the preservation concept
and provides the most effective way for the protection of the work by giving the artist the right
of integrity and the power to enforce it.").
119. Edward J. Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of
Moral Rights Protection for Visual Art, 29 CATH. L. REV. 945, 954-55 (1990).
120. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e). The waiver provision has been the subject of considerable con-
troversy. One view is that those most in need of protection, unknown emerging artists, are also
the most vulnerable to signing away rights. Thomas J. Davis, Jr., Fine Art and Moral Rights:
The Immoral Triumph of Emotionalism, 17 HOFSTRA L. REv. 317, 360 (1989) ("The artist's
ability to waive any and all of the protections under the statutes undermines one of the central
purposes for their adoption. Whether one views the statutes as protecting artists alone or both
artists and the public, waiver is a dagger in the heart of the protection.").
The other view, one ultimately adopted by the Judiciary Subcommittee for incorporation
into the Act, is that of Professor Ginsburg:
Arguably, the best recognition of moral rights would countenance no waivers. This
position, however, is probably too extreme for the U.S. system, nor does Berne re-
quire it. As a practical matter, moreover, despite their formal prohibition, de facto
waivers are likely to occur. The artist is better protected under a regime requiring
specificity of waivers than under one where an ideologically pure no-waiver law is
rarely in fact observed.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 18. The House Report states that the Act does not
permit blanket waivers, and the waiver is effective only to the specific person to whom it is
made. Id. at 19. The statute only allows for an express waiver in a written instrument signed
by the author, or any one of joint authors. 17 U.S.C. § 106(A)(e).
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cause this provision is currently under study by the Register of Copy-
rights, its future is uncertain.
In addition, Congress modified 17 U.S.C. section 301 to include a
provision which controls preemption of state law in relation to the
Act. '2 Essentially, it provides that any causes of action commenced af-
ter June 1, 1991, concerning equivalent rights granted in the Visual Art-
ists Rights Act are preempted. 122  If, however, state law established
rights beyond the life of the author, that protection is not preempted.2 3
III
The Problem of Preemption After the Enactment of the
Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990
Prior to the Visual Artists Rights Act, eleven states had some form
of moral rights protection. 124  The statutes vary in scope, but, in some
instances, they give the artist greater protection than does federal law.
Courts will be asked to determine whether artists in those states retain
state law protection.
A. The Concept of Federal Copyright Preemption
The federal constitutional system distributes power between two
spheres of government: federal and state. 125 Preemption inevitably in-
121. Section 301(0 provides:
(1) On [June 1, 1991], all legal and equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the
rights conferred by 106A with respect to works of visual art to which the rights
conferred by section 106A apply are governed exclusively by section 106A and sec-
tion 113(d) and the provisions of this title relating to such sections. Thereafter, no
person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any work of visual art under
the common law or statutes of any State.
(2) Nothing in paragraph (1) annuls or limits any rights or remedies under the
common law or statutes of any State with respect to-
(A) any cause of action from undertakings commenced before (June 1, 1991];
(B) activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any
of the rights conferred by section 106A with respect to works of visual art;
(C) activities violating legal or equitable rights which extend beyond the life of
the author.
17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (Supp. 1991).
122. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1) (Supp. 1991).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 301(O(2)(C) (Supp. 1991).
124. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 987-90 (West Supp. 1989); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42-116t
(West Supp. 1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, para. 1401-08 (Smith-Hurd 1991); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2151-56 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 303 (West 1988); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85S (West Supp. 1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:24A-1 (West
1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-4B (Michie 1991); N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW §§ 14.01-03
(McKinney 1988); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 2101-10 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-62-2 to -6
(1987).
125. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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volves an examination of this relationship and its resulting tensions. As
stated in The Federalist,
[a]n entire consolidation of the States into one complete national sover-
eignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and whatever
powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent on the
general will. But as the plan of the [Constitutional] Convention aims
only at a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
clearly retain all of the sovereignty which they before had, and which
were not, by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of State sovereignty,
would only exist in three cases: where the Constitution in express
terms granted an exclusive authority to the Union; where it granted in
one instance an authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the
States from exercising the like authority; and where it granted an au-
thority to the Union, to which a similar authority in the States would
be absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
1 26
Federal preemption under the Constitution is governed by three in-
teractive principles. First, if Congress acts within the authority delegated
by the Constitution, its ability to preempt conflicting state law, either
completely or partially, flows directly from the substantive source of
power coupled with the Supremacy Clause of Article VI.127 Second, un-
less Congress either expressly or impliedly occupies an entire field, con-
current power may be exercised by both federal and state authority.1 2
Third, exercise of national power on any subject should not bar State
action on the same subject unless there is a positive inconsistency.
1 29
Absent an explicit Congressional intent to preempt every aspect of a
subject field, courts are often left the task of determining the extent of
federal preemption. 130 The examination is often an inquiry into whether
Congress intended that the subject matter of a field be governed by a
uniform, national system or by localized, domestic control.131 Addi-
tional factors that may be determinative when assessing the Congres-
126. THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 241 (Alexander Hamilton) (B. Wright ed., 1961), quoted
in Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-53 (1972).
127. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-25, at 479 (2d ed.
1988).
128. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461
U.S. 190, 203-04 (1983).
129. See id. at 204. The Supreme Court uses the following test to determine whether a
state law is preempted:
If Congress evidences an intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within
that field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over
the matter in question, state law is still preempted to the extent it actually conflicts
with federal law, that is, when it is impossible to comply with both state and federal
law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.
Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984) (citations omitted).
130. JOSEPH F. ZIMMERMAN, FEDERAL PREEMPTION 113-14 (1991).
131. Id. at 114.
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sional purpose are whether a diversity of conditions exists geographically
which affects the subject field, and whether the limited capacity of the
federal government to monitor local developments makes total preemp-
tion impracticable.
13 2
B. Preemption and Copyright
The Copyright Clause133 grants Congress the power to enact na-
tional legislation for the protection of artists and authors. Historically,
Congress has shared this authority with the states.134 In Goldstein v. Cal-
ifornia,13 this sharing of power was called into question before the U.S.
Supreme Court. At issue was whether federal copyright law preempted a
California criminal statute prohibiting unauthorized duplication of
sound recordings. The Court held that the states retain the power to
regulate copyright protection if no conflict exists with federal law. The
Court analogized to the constitutional grant of commerce power and de-
termined that Copyright law was governed by similar principles. The
Goldstein Court thus incorporated the reasoning of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens1 36 into the field of copyright preemption: "Whatever subjects of
this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform
system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as
to require exclusive legislation by Congress."1 37 The Goldstein Court
reasoned that because the subject matter of copyright may be of purely
local importance and unprotected by the federal statute, no "unyielding
national interest" required the states to relinquish power to exclusive fed-
eral control.1 38 Chief Justice Burger, in his opinion for the majority,
stated, "Although the Copyright Clause thus recognizes the potential
benefits of a national system, it does not indicate that all writings are of
national interest or that state legislation is, in all cases, unnecessary or
precluded."
1 39
132. See id. at 136; see also Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851);
TRIBE, supra note 127, § 6-4, at 407 ("[T]he enduring legacy of Cooley has been this basic
theme: The validity of state action affecting interstate commerce must be judged in light of the
desirability of permitting diverse responses to local needs and the undesirability of permitting
local interference .... ").
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (granting power to the Congress "[to] promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
134. See, e.g., Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834) (acknowledging the validity of
state common law copyright).
135. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
136. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
137. Id. at 319.
138. Goldstein, 412 U.S. at 558.
139. Id. at 556-57.
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Further, the Court determined that the California statute was not
void under the Supremacy Clause. Because the case was decided under
the 1909 Copyright Act, which did not protect sound recordings, the
Court found that federal law had left this area unattended through inac-
tion."1 Therefore, the California statute did not transgress the standard
established in Hines v. Davidowitz141: "whether, under the circumstances
of this particular case, [the state's] law stands as an obstacle to the ac-
complishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress."
1 42
C. The Question of Statutory Construction
Congress amended 17 U.S.C. section 301 to add a preemption provi-
sion to the Visual Artists Rights Act. As drafted, 14 3 this provision poses
some complex questions of statutory construction in relation to existing
state moral rights statutes. For example, "equivalent rights" are pre-
empted; 44 however, nowhere is this term defined. Similarly, rights
"with respect to works of visual art to which the rights conferred by
section 106A apply"1 45 are preempted, but works which are specifically
excluded by the Act may be eligible for protection under state law. Fur-
ther, it is unclear whether preemption is appropriate if a technical defect,
such as the omission of a number on a limited edition print, prevents a
work from coming within the Act's parameters. Additionally, no provi-
sion is made for choice of law if protection is continued after an artist's
death by virtue of state law. 1 46 The answers to these questions will deter-
mine whether artists in some states will receive less protection under the
Act than they had previously enjoyed under preexisting state moral
rights statutes. 147
Such ambiguity is not only undesirable as a practical matter, but it
also conflicts with the arguments made in favor of the Act's passage.
When Congress considered the bill, proponents noted that in California,
where analogous protection existed, a "blizzard of litigation" has not en-
sued. 148 Testimony at the subcommittee hearings indicated that this was
due in part to the clarity of the California Arts Preservation Act; under
140. Id. at 570.
141. 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
142. Id. at 67 (citation omitted).
143. See supra note 121 for text of 17 U.S.C. § 301(f) (Supp. 1991).
144. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0(1).
145. Id.
146. 4 MELVILLE & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8.21[B] (1991).
147. Damich, supra note 119, at 972; 4 NIMMER, supra note 144, § 8.21[B].
148. Senate Hearings, supra note 16, at 142.
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California law, both parties had sufficient knowledge to decide whether
to comply with the Act, settle, or proceed with a lawsuit.149
D. Approaches to Preemption
Several possible interpretations of the preemption provision exist.
The provision does not seem to evidence Congressional intent to preempt
all state laws completely, at least with respect to protection during the
artist's lifetime.15° The Act provides: "Nothing ... shall annul or limit
any rights or remedies under the common law or Statutes of any state
with respect to ... activities violating legal or equitable rights that are
not equivalent to any of the rights conferred by [the Act] with respect to
works of visual art." ' Under Goldstein v. California, state laws are not
void under the Supremacy Clause where the area sought to be regulated
by the state is left unattended by federal law and no actual conflict ex-
ists.152 Because the Act does not encompass the breadth of all moral
rights protection, and because the purposes of the Act can be accom-
plished concurrently with state moral rights legislation, no constitutional
barriers appear to prevent concurrent federal and state regulation of
moral rights. In light of the express language of the Act and the lack of a
constitutional barrier, the preemption provision appears to allow some
measure of state moral rights legislation.'53
1. Nimmer's View
Professor Nimmer's treatise suggests one possible interpretation:
"Construction of this provision should follow the general jurisprudence
of copyright preemption"' 54 as it exists under the 1976 Copyright Act
("1976 Act"). Although Nimmer's analysis is consistent with a sound
general rule of statutory construction that "all legislation must be inter-
preted in light of the common law and the scheme of jurisprudence ex-
isting at the time of its enactment,"' 1 5 this solution may raise more
problems than it solves.
149. Id.
150. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(0, supra note 121.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
152. 412 U.S. 546, 570 (1973).
153. The Committee stated:
Consistent with current law on preemption for economic rights, the new Federal law
will not preempt State causes of action relating to works that are not covered by the
law, such as audiovisual works, photographs produced for non-exhibition purposes,
and works in which the copyright has been transferred before the effective date.
H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 21.
154. 4 NIMMER, supra note 146, § 8.21[B], at 292.
155. 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
421 (1984). This treatise also states: "The legislature is presumed to know the prior construc-
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The general jurisprudence of copyright preemption under the 1976
Act requires that two conditions be satisfied before preemption will oc-
cur: 1) the work in question must be within the subject matter of copy-
right as defined under the copyright code; and 2) the right created under
state law must be equivalent to any exclusive copyrights as defined in the
copyright code.' 5 6 Judicial interpretation of these requirements has been
the subject of conflicting analysis. As many as five different tests are in
use to determine whether a right is an "equivalent right., 157 Given the
current morass of varying interpretations, it is unlikely that a "general
jurisprudence" is truly definable. Furthermore, using the construction of
the pre-existing provision would likely result in a very broad reading of
the Act's preemption section.
Regarding the first prong, courts have found that state law is pre-
empted under the 1976 Copyright Act because of the work's failure to
meet the technical requirements for protection. 58  As stated by one
court,
Were this not so, states would be free to expand the perimeters of
copyright protection to their own liking, on the theory that preemption
would be no bar to state protection of material not meeting federal
statutory standards. That interpretation would run directly afoul of
one of the [1976 Copyright] Act's central purposes, to "avoid the de-
velopment of any vague borderline areas between State and Federal
protection."' 5 9
For example, in Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 6 the
court found that the design of a glass Christmas tree ornament continued
to be within the subject matter of the 1976 Act, and therefore state law
was preempted. However, the court found that because the work was
tion of the original act or code and if previously construed terms in the unamended sections
are used in the amendment, it is indicated that the legislature intended to adopt the prior
construction of those terms." IA SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION 296 (1984).
156. Wojnarowicz v. American Family Ass'n, 745 F. Supp. 130, 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The
analysis will be similar under the Visual Artists Rights Act. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note
17, at 21. The fundamental question is how broadly the preemption question should be con-
strued in a given factual situation.
157. Patrick McNamara, Note, Copyright Preemption: Effecting the Analysis Prescribed by
Section 301, 24 B.C. L. REV. 963, 984 (1983).
158. The Committee stated:
As long as a work fits within one of the general subject matter categories of sections
102 and 103, the bill prevents the States from protecting it even if it fails to achieve
Federal statutory copyright because it is too minimal or lacking in originality to
qualify, or because it has fallen into the public domain.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988). See
also 1 NIMMER, supra note 146, § 1.01[B].
159. Harper & Row, Publishers v. Nation Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 200 (2d Cir. 1983), rev'd
on other grounds, 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
160. 601 F. Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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within the public domain, the design was outside the protection of the
U.S. Copyright Act, and dismissed the claim.
Preemption is similarly broad under the second prong of the analy-
sis. In the determination of whether a state offers a right "equivalent" to
federal law, courts find that state law is preempted even if the "precise
contours" of state and federal law differ. 161 Perhaps the most prominent
test in this area dictates that this prong of the test is satisfied when an
underlying factual predicate which would constitute a valid state law
claim violates any of the rights set forth in the 1976 Act. 162 The state
law is not preempted, however, where a valid claim must state an extra
"element" which is not a requirement for recovery under the Copyright
Act.' 63 For example, a claim for the breach of a trade secret requires
proof of "secrecy"; this "extra element" prevents its preemption by the
Copyright Act.' 6 ' Under the "extra element" test, state law claims for
unjust enrichment, unfair competition, and misappropriation have all
been held preempted because they involved rights equivalent to
copyright. 165
Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardener, Inc. 166 well illustrates
the application of the "extra element" test. In Del Madera, the court
found that a claim for unjust enrichment did not require proof of an
"extra element" beyond those required for a copyright claim. To reach
this determination, the court examined the underlying factual predicate:
the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had violated an implied promise
not to use a map for which the plaintiffs owned a valid copyright.1
67
Rejecting the argument that requirements for proof of an implied prom-
ise provided the "extra element" needed to separate this claim from a
copyright claim, the court stated that "an implied promise not to use or
161. 1 NIMMER, supra note 146, § 1.01[B].
162. Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players, 805 F.2d 663, 676-77 (7th Cir.
1986).
See also Howard B. Abrams, Copyright, Misappropriation and Preemption: Constitutional
and Statutory Limits of State Law Protection, 1983 Sup. Cr. REv. 509, 556 ("A functional
approach is to examine the impact and effect of the right asserted at state law and its remedy.
If the effect is to place the defendant under the same kind of restrictions from copying and use
as would the copyright laws, then the right is preempted.").
163. A cause of action for copyright infringement requires: 1) that a work be protected by
copyright; 2) that the plaintiff owns the copyright; and 3) that the copyright was infringed by
the defendant's acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, or display. If a state right
contains a different characteristic that must be proven, then an "extra element" exists and state
law is not preempted. See SBK Catalogue Partnership v. Orion Pictures, 723 F. Supp. 1053,
1066 (D.N.J. 1989).
164. 1 NIMMER, supra note 146, § 1.01[B].
165. Del Madera Properties v. Rhodes & Gardener, Inc., 820 F.2d 973, 976 (9th Cir.
1987).
166. Id
167. Id. at 975.
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copy materials within , the subject matter of copyright is equivalent to
protection provided by [the Copyright Act]." 16
Similarly, in Baltimore Orioles v. Major League Baseball Players,'69
a case which examined baseball players' rights in the unauthorized
broadcast of their performance at games, the court determined that fed-
eral copyright law preempted the right of publicity. The court found
that fixing the players' performance in a "tangible medium of expres-
sion"' 0 by recording the game via television cameras satisfied the origi-
nality requirement, bringing the work within the subject matter of
copyright. 171 Because the telecast of the games also constituted the re-
production and distribution 172 of protected subject matter, violation of
the right of publicity violated an "equivalent right" under copyright law;
thus preemption was proper.
1 73
Applying a similar test in the context of moral rights would result in
extensive preemption of existing state law. For example, in Wojnarowicz
v. American Family Association,174 the court determined that the defend-
ant had violated the New York Authorship Rights Act by mailing pam-
phlets containing reproductions of the plaintiff's artwork which were so
cropped that a viewer would be misled as to their communicative and
artistic message.' 75 Similar to the Visual Artists Rights Act, the New
York Authorship Rights Act protects the reputation of an artist by
preventing the display or distribution of a work of fine art, or a reproduc-
tion thereof, in an altered or modified form.176 Wojnarowicz concerned
an unsigned reproduction of the artist's work, which is not explicitly cov-
ered by the Visual Artists Rights Act. Because this "work of fine art"
does not meet the technical specifications of the Act, it is unclear
whether the artist's rights would be preempted by federal law. Similarly,
because the plaintiff must prove that the defendant published or dis-
played the work in addition to proving its modification, this "extra ele-
ment" could prevent preemption. However, a broad reading of the Act,
such as that used by the Baltimore Orioles court, could allow preemption
because the subject matter concerns a work of fine art and because the
168. Id. at 977.
169. 805 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1986).
170. Copyrightable subject matter is comprised of "original works of authorship fixed in
any tangible medium of expression." 17 U.S.C. § 102 (West 1977).
171. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 674-75.
172. Both reproduction and distribution are protected rights. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
173. Baltimore Orioles, 805 F.2d at 676-79.
174. 745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990), discussed in text, supra note 68.
175. Id. at 136-39.
176. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 13.03 (McKinney Supp. 1988).
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violation of the New York Authorship Rights Act also violates the moral
right of the artist.
177
Application of the jurisprudence of the 1976 Act to the newly en-
acted Visual Artists Rights Act is unwarranted, because the 1976 Act
was enacted at a different time for an entirely different purpose. The
1976 Act articulated a balance between the interests of authors in origi-
nal works and the public interest in access to ideas and information.17
To take a concrete example, if the 1976 Act permitted works to fall into
the public domain too quickly, authors would not have sufficient incen-
tive to produce new, high-quality work. On the other hand, if the 1976
Act provided more extended protection, other prospective authors would
be inhibited both by a lack of source material and a danger of inadvertent
infringement. Moral rights protection, which was instituted to shield the
right of the artist's personality and to preserve an artifact for future gen-
erations, does not involve these same justifications.
Perhaps more importantly for the question of preemption, the pur-
pose of the 1976 provision was to abolish the common law system of
protection for unpublished works. The 1976 Act's committee notes
stress "its unqualified intention that Congress shall act preemptively, and
to avoid the development of any vague borderline areas between State
and Federal protection."'7 9 In contrast, the legislative history of the Vis-
ual Artists Rights Act specifically states that rights such as misattribu-
tion and resale royalty were not to be preempted.' 80 This may indicate
that a more cautionary approach was intended. Because this preemption
section is tailored to the Visual Artists Rights Act, the better solution
may be to apply the following rule: If a section refers to another whole
statute, the section should be read in connection with the statute to
177. Professor Nimmer has also suggested that all "artworks" in the lay sense may be
subject to preemption, arguing that "it would be ironic for such unqualifying works to claim
possibly greater protection under state law than qualifying works receive under the Visual
Artists Rights Act of 1990 itself." 4 NIMMER, supra note 146, § 8.21[B], at 290. This view
would be consistent with that of the court in Mayer v. Josiah Wedgewood & Sons, Ltd., 601 F.
Supp. 1523 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), discussed in text, supra note 160.
178. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 111 S. Ct. 1282, 1292-93 (1991).
179. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1976), reprinted in 17 U.S.C.A. § 301
(West Supp. 1991).
Admittedly, the legislative history does not control the construction of a statute. See 2A
SINGER, supra note 155, at 284 ("Basing decisions of statutory interpretation on historical
events that are, practically speaking, obscured from the awareness of persons not directly in-
volved in the legislative process has the character of enforcing secret laws."). However, it has
often been said that legislative history may be the most useful indication of congressional in-
tent for recently enacted statutes. See, e.g., Brock v. Writers Guild of America, 762 F.2d 1349,
1353 (9th Cir. 1985) ("In construing a statute in a case of first impression, we look to the
traditional signposts of statutory construction: first, the language of the statute itself; second,
its legislative history.") (citing Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184 (1985)).
180. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 21.
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which it refers.' 8' For the foregoing reasons, applying the decisional law
of a preexisting, but unrelated, provision is inappropriate.
2. Damich's View
Professor Edward Damich proposes an alternative solution.
Damich argues that where both state and federal moral rights statutes
are at issue, narrow preemption under the Act is justified, permitting art-
ists to retain the maximum moral rights protection. 8 2 Damich points
out that, under the plain meaning of the statute, only those rights which
"exactly correspond" to rights under the Act should be preempted. 8 3
Although he acknowledges that the term "equivalent right" has histori-
cally allowed for broader judicial construction, 8 4 Damich draws an in-
ference from the absence of certain language.' 8l He notes that the 1976
Act expressly preempted rights "within the general scope of copy-
right." 86  The absence of such language in the new provision, in
Damich's view, justifies a narrow reading. 8 7
Damich further argues that in adopting the Berne Implementation
Act, Congress relied upon state moral rights statutes to establish that the
United States currently met Berne requirements.188 Damich reasons that
"nonpreemption is consistent with the intent of Congress, which relied
on the state statutes in concluding that the United States complied suffi-
ciently with article 6bis to join the Berne Convention."' 8 9 However,
Congress' own justification seems artificial; as only eleven out of fifty
states offer any form of moral rights protection, some of which may not
comply with Berne, it is doubtful whether this minimal participation
truly brought the United States within Berne compliance. Furthermore,
181. See IA SINGER, supra note 155, at 296.
182. Damich, supra note 119, at 972-73.
183. Id. at 972.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 973.
186. Id. at 973 n.147.
187. Id. at 973. Although this argument is persuasive, it is equally plausible that "within
the general scope" was simply meant to substitute for the enumeration of the many copyright
provisions contained throughout Title 17. Its absence in the recent amendment may be due to
the fact that specific reference to the Visual Artists Rights Act makes the broader language
unnecessary.
188. Id.
189. Id. Professor Damich further proposes that a former version of the preemption provi-
sion of the Act is preferable. This provision did not preempt state moral rights protection
under common law or statute as long as the state statute did not diminish or prevent the
exercise of the federal moral right under the bill. Id. at 972. Thus, the federal statute would
become the "floor" of moral rights; a state could offer more protection if desired. Id. at 947-
48.
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it can be argued that today state laws are no longer necessary for Berne
compliance due to the Act's passage.
3. Zuber's View
In contrast, commentator Joseph Zuber advocates broader preemp-
tion. 191 Assessing the impact of the Act on California's and New York's
moral rights statutes, Zuber concludes that preemption is proper where
state law generally protects interests similar to those protected under fed-
eral law. 9 I For example, Zuber states that California's Art Preservation
Act is almost entirely preempted for actions brought by the artist during
his lifetime.192 Zuber points out that the rights conferred by the Califor-
nia statute are "essentially identical" to those under the Act, and, relying
upon the Act's legislative history, proposes that preemption is likely.193
However, Zuber asserts that one aspect of the New York Authorship
Rights Act significantly differs from the Act and may therefore survive
preemption194: the New York Act permits an artist to disavow author-
ship of a reproduction of his work for a just and valid reason, while the
Visual Artists Rights Act expressly excludes this right as applied to re-
productions.195 Because the Act's legislative history expressly states that
the right to disavow a reproduction is not "equivalent" to a federal right,
Zuber maintains that preemption is not proper.
196
On the other hand, regarding the right of integrity, Zuber argues
that the New York Act "provides no substantive protection in this area
that is not provided under the 1990 Act.' ' 97 The New York Act states:
No person other than the artist ... shall knowingly display in a place
accessible to the public or publish a work of fine art or limited edition
multiple of not more than three hundred copies by that artist or a pro-
duction thereof in an altered, defaced, mutilated or modified form if
the work is displayed, published or reproduced as being the work of
the artist.. . and damage to the artist's reputation is reasonably likely
to result therefrom ... 198
It is perhaps not entirely clear that the New York Act is "nar-
rower"' 99 than the Act. For example, it would seem that the New York
Act would permit recovery where a defendant was negligent in the act of
190. Joseph Zuber, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990-What it Does, and What it
Preempts, 23 PAC. L.J. 445 (1992).
191. Id.
192. Id. at 498-99.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 503-04.
195. Id. at 503.
196. Id. at 503-04.
197. Id. at 504.
198. N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03(1) (McKinney Supp. 1992).
199. Zuber, supra note 190, at 504.
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modification, so long as the defendant "knowingly display[ed]" the work.
The federal Act does not permit recovery where the defendant was negli-
gent in the act of modification, regardless of the defendant's state of mind
when displaying the work. In this respect, Zuber's analysis reflects the
inherent problem in applying this provision: the Visual Artists Rights
Act is vague regarding preemption.
Zuber's arguments regarding broad preemption rely primarily upon
the committee's comments.2" It is debatable, however, whether much
guidance can be drawn from the sparse comment. Although the Act's
legislative history may offer some useful guidance about preemption," 1




Copyright preemption, as governed by Goldstein, allows for the ex-
ercise of concurrent power so long as state law does not conflict with
federal law. Consistent with these constitutional principles, preemption
is appropriate only if state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."202
Therefore, the key question under Goldstein is to what degree, if at all,
states' moral rights protection may extend to areas "left unattended" by
federal law. Since it is difficult to see that any fundamental conflict exists
as a practical matter, artists in states already offering moral rights legisla-
tion should be able to seek protection under those laws. States should be
able to continue to experiment with moral rights protection, so that expe-
rience gained at the local level might be considered for later nationwide
adoption. Similarly, a state with a local preference for giving extra pro-
tection to its creators of applied arts, as distinguished from fine artists,
should be permitted to do so. As the Court stated in Bonito Boats v.
Thunder Craft Boats,2"3 "Where 'Congress determines that neither fed-
eral protection nor freedom from restraint is required by the national
interest,' the States remain free to promote originality and creativity in
their own domains." 2" In the Act, Congress has expressed no "unyield-
200. Id.
201. Although the use of legislative history for discerning the legislative purpose of a stat-
ute for preemption purposes is routine, scholarly criticism casts doubt on this practice. See W.
David Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the
Rule of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992) (author questions the constitutionality and sound-
ness of consulting legislative history for interpretation).
202. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
203. 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
204. Id. at 165 (quoting Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 559 (1973)).
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ing national interest" that would require states to relinquish all authority
to federal law in moral rights protection.
It can be argued that the legislative history indicates that one Con-
gressional purpose of the Act was to provide a uniform system of protec-
tion of an artist's reputation and creative works.2°5 As the Register of
Copyrights noted, "[a] single Federal system is preferable to State stat-
utes or municipal ordinances on moral rights because creativity is stimu-
lated more effectively on a uniform, national basis."2" However, to infer
that uniformity is a necessary corollary to the Act's substantive protec-
tion is a debatable proposition. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the sub-
stantive goals of the Act are relevant to the preemption analysis. As
stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Cipollone v. Liggett Group,2"7
When Congress has considered the issue of pre-emption and has in-
cluded in the enacted legislation a provision explicitly addressing that
issue, and when that provision provides "a reliable indicium of con-
gressional intent with respect to state authority," "there is no need to
infer congressional intent to pre-empt state laws from the substantive
provisions" of the legislation.208
Where the Act has left certain areas of moral rights protection unat-
tended, the express language of the preemption section as approved by
Congress permits state moral rights regulation. According to section
301(0, all rights that are equivalent to the rights granted in the Act are
preempted "with respect to works of visual art to which the rights con-
ferred by section 106A apply." 2" According to this language, the Act
must confer an equivalent right on a "work of visual art"210 before state
law is preempted. However, states should be able to protect media com-
pletely unaddressed by the Act. For example, a state should be permit-
ted to protect works of applied art. If in the interest of fostering local
creativity, Pennsylvania seeks to extend moral rights protection to work
made by fine furniture makers, such a statute would not likely "stand[]
205. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 21.
206. Id. Although probably not every artist would embrace that proposition, it is plausible
that art purchasing is stimulated more effectively by a clear indication of prospective parties'
rights. For example, attorney Peter Karlen, in his statement to the Senate subcommittee,
stated that, "An artist shipping works in interstate commerce should not have to worry about
conflict of laws or the vagaries of various state laws in order to determine what her rights are."
Mr. Karlen cited the example of two of his clients who had shipped work interstate which was
destroyed in transit. Considerable problems arose when it could not be determined where the
destruction took place, which would have determined which state's law would apply. Senate
Hearings, supra note 16, at 99.
207. 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992).
208. Id. at 2618 (citations omitted).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
210. The term "work of visual art" is defined in 17 U.S.C. § 101. See note 95, supra.
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as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes
and objectives of Congress."
211
Perhaps more controversial is whether works specifically excluded
under the Act are "left unattended by federal law." Arguably, because
section 106A does not confer rights on excluded works, states retain "the
implied reservation of power to fill out the scheme." '212 As the Supreme
Court has stated, "the case for federal preemption is particularly weak
where Congress has indicated its awareness of the operation of state law
in a field of federal interest, and has nonetheless decided to 'stand by
both concepts and to tolerate whatever tension there [is] between
them.' "" On the other hand, one might argue that Congress intended
that certain works never receive moral rights protection.21 4
Nevertheless, state protection of works that are excluded by the Act
is consistent with Supreme Court precedent. First, Congress has not ex-
pressly preempted states' moral rights legislation for excluded works.
Second, because section 301 provides that state law is not annulled or
limited regarding nonequivalent rights with respect to works of visual
art, there is no Congressional "intent to occupy a given field." 2 5 Third,
the purposes of both state and federal moral rights statutes do not con-
flict: both protect the right of personality of the artist as embodied in a
work. Although some states may place more emphasis upon the reputa-
tion of the artist compared with the preservation of the work,21 6 neither
of these two goals is in conflict with the Act, which is intended to "pro-
tect both the reputations of certain visual artists and the works of art
they create."'
21 7
Section 301 preempts state laws that are "equivalent" to those con-
ferred under the Act without providing any guidance as to when one
right may be considered "equivalent" to another.2"' Because it appears
211. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
212. Tousey v. North Am. Van Lines, Inc., 752 F.2d 96, 102 (4th Cir. 1985) (where a
federal agency declines to regulate an area, states have the power to enact laws so long as no
conflict with federal power exists) (citation omitted).
213. Bonito Boats v. Thundercraft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 166-67 (1989) (quoting Silkwood v.
Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 256 (1984)).
214. Cf KVUE, Inc. v. Austin Broadcasting Corp., 709 F.2d 922, 934-36 (5th Cir. 1983)
(where Congress specifically regulated rates charged by broadcasters to political candidates,
state law could not proscribe more favorable rates; state law would impermissibly invalidate
the purpose of the federal law).
215. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 248.
216. As reflected in their popular names, the California Art Preservation Act and the New
York Authorship Rights Act have been seen as having dissimilar goals. See Edward J.
Damich, The New York Authorship Rights Act: A Comparative Critique, 84 COLUM. L. REV.
1733, 1746-47 (1984).
217. H.R. REP. No. 514, supra note 17, at 5.
218. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
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that no judicial interpretation of section 301 exists as of the time of publi-
cation,219 no definitive answer is available. One solution would follow
the guidance of the French system of artist's protection. Under that
analysis, a legally protectible interest analogous to droit moral would be
considered "equivalent" to moral rights conferred by the Act. However,
because the Act does not confer an equivalent right to droit de suite,
which protects the economic interest in the rise in value of work, resale
royalty provisions of state statutes should remain in effect.22°
Additionally, state laws should be allowed to give protection to
work during time periods not covered by the Act. For works created but
not sold until after June 1, 1991, rights conferred by the Act "expire at
the same time as the rights conferred by [the 1976 Copyright Act]. 2 2 1
The 1976 Act expires fifty years after the author's death.222 The Act
therefore indicates that federal law continues in force during this fifty-
year time period. State laws that confer protection beyond the fifty-year
span or that eliminate the requirement that the work be created but not
transferred before June 1, 1991, should not be preempted. Section 301
does not limit "any rights or remedies under the ... statutes of any
State" where an equivalent has not been conferred by the Act.223
The plain meaning of the preemption section appears to dictate
these results. As Professor Laurence Tribe has stated,
Above all, perhaps the most fundamental point to remember is that the
preemption analysis is, or should be, a matter of statutory construction
219. As of the time of publication, this author has discovered only one case that has consid-
ered the preemption issues generated by the Act. In Gegenhuber v. Hystopolis Prods., Inc.,
No. 92 C 1055, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10156, at *1 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1992). the court consid-
ered whether the Act preempted a state statute granting injunctive relief for deceptive trade
practices. The case involved two plaintiffs who created, designed, and directed the original
theatrical performance of a puppet show. After the plaintiffs left the theater company, the
defendants produced another run of the play without giving full credit to the plaintiffs. Be-
cause the court found that the work was not within the scope of works protected by the Act's
right of attribution, the plaintiffs' claims were not preempted. Id. at * 12. The court acknowl-
edged that the puppets, costumes and sets could conceivably be considered "visual art" under
the Act, but refused to read protection into section 301 absent express language by Congress.
Id. at *11-12. The court stated:
We will not read into the VARA that which Congress has evidently chosen to leave
out, for, having included extensive categories of works that do or do not constitute
"visual art," Congress could have included works such as puppets, costumes and sets
if it desired to afford them the protections of section 106A.
This result appears consistent with Goldstein and the plain language of the preemption
provision. Gegenhuber, however, is an "easy case" because theatrical productions are clearly
unprotected under the Act. Moreover, the Illinois Deceptive Trade Practices statute does not
confer a moral, and therefore "equivalent," right.
220. For a discussion of droit de suite, see supra note 32 and accompanying text.
221. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(d)(2) (Supp. 1991).
222. 17 U.S.C. § 302 (1988).
223. 17 U.S.C. § 301(0.
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rather than free-form judicial policymaking .... [I]t is one thing to
pursue a specialized approach unless and until Congress says some-
thing to overturn it, and something else again to approach preemption
issues generally as though one were doing something other than read-
ing an applicable federal statute.
224
Following the legislature's express language will not only provide those
parties who must ultimately comply with the Act a better awareness of
their obligations, but it will also permit states to make independent deci-
sions regarding the scope of moral rights within their borders.
V
Conclusion
The Visual Artists Rights Act provides needed protection for intel-
lectual property in the United States. Moral rights under the Act, how-
ever, are limited in comparison with moral rights protection in some
states and in other countries. The expansion of artists' protection may
depend upon the Act's viability and the ability of states to continue to
experiment with moral rights legislation. Additionally, the Act may
serve as the basis for moral rights expansion into other areas of intellec-
tual property law.
The preemption provision, although troublesome to interpret,
should permit state regulation of moral rights that have been "left unat-
tended by federal law." This section should be interpreted according to
its language in light of Supreme Court precedent. As written, Congress
has expressed no "unyielding national interest" which prevents states
from legislating moral rights in areas unregulated by the Act.
224. TRIBE, supra note 127, § 6-30, at 510-11.
[V/ol. 15:165
